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Abstract 
We investigate the role of Italian firms in labour productivity performance. We find that 
family-owned firms have lower labour productivity than their non-family counterparts. In a 
second step, we estimate the role of firm-level bargaining (FLB) to determine whether family-
controlled firms that adopt this type of bargaining may partially close the gap in terms of labour 
productivity with their non-family competitors. Our results, obtained through IV estimation to 
control for endogeneity bias, suggest that enterprises under family governance achieve 
significant labour productivity gains — greater than those achieved by their non-family 
counterparts — when they adopt firm-level bargaining.  
  
JEL Classifications: G32, G34, D24. 
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Introduction 
Despite the rich literature on family-controlled firms, limited empirical research has 
addressed the role of these firms in productivity performance (Barbera and Moores, 2013), and 
no conclusive results have been obtained. On theoretical grounds, the debate on family 
businesses has involved conflicting arguments about the role of family involvement. The 
stewardship view suggests that family members have a strong attachment to the firm; they 
pursue aims that benefit all stakeholders and place the firm’s objectives ahead of their own 
personal aims. By contrast, the agency cost perspective suggests that family members have 
detrimental effects on firm value because they act based on private purposes that lead them to 
extract resources to obtain personal interests (Le Breton-Miller and Miller, 2009). Neither 
approach has clearly identified, as noted by Martikainen et al. (2009, p. 296), the specific 
‘microeconomic mechanism’ through which family firm involvement may affect firm 
performance and labour productivity.  
The work in this paper proposes to address this theoretical gap in the agency-stewardship 
debate by showing that one difference between family and non-family firms is represented by 
their different abilities to productively exploit, through firm-level bargaining (FLB), a set of 
strategic choices on issues such as working time, incentive pay, training programmes and labour 
organization. These choices, which are included within practices of human resources 
management (HRM), are of paramount importance, especially for countries such as Italy that are 
dominated by small enterprises whose ownership and control are mainly concentrated in families 
(Cucculelli et al. 2014).  
In this paper, our preliminary purpose is to determine whether the predominance of firms that 
are owned and managed by families rather than professional managers plays a role in explaining 
the unsatisfactory productivity results recorded by the Italian economy. Our estimates, which are 
in line with the few studies that explore this issue (see Cucculelli et al. 2014), suggest a negative 
role for ownership and for a ‘mode of governance’ characterized by the leadership of families 
rather than qualified outside managers. We then address our key research question: whether FLB 
may provide a specific microeconomic mechanism through which family leadership may be 
conducive to labour productivity gains[i].  
FLB, which provides an important element of flexibility in industrial relations, may allow 
family firms to adopt labour and wage practices that are more closely tailored to their specific 
needs and that favour the implementation of more productive strategies. Indeed, FLB may induce 
‘relational governance’, which fosters strategic commitments to employees and helps family 
firms reduce the gap in labour productivity with their non-family competitors. 
To test these hypotheses, we use a unique and rich dataset for the Italian economy provided by 
ISFOL (Istituto per lo Sviluppo della Formazione Professionale dei Lavoratori – Institute for the 
Development of Workers Professional Training) that covers a nationally representative sample of 
Italian firms. We focus on the conditional mean model with OLS estimates and adopt the Koenker 
and Basset (1978) estimator to study the productivity impact of FLB along the entire conditional 
productivity distribution. This approach allows us to shed light on the heterogeneous effects of 
FLB and to determine whether firms at the bottom of the productivity distribution benefit from 
FLB differently than their peers at the top. 
In addition, we employ instrumental variable approaches in quantile regressions, approaches 
that are not straightforward in quantile regression models. We adopt the Two-Stages Least 
Absolute Deviation Estimator (IVQR_2LAD) of Amemya (1982) and the Quantile Treatment 
Effect Estimator of Abadie et al. (2002) (IVQR_AAI) to address the likely endogeneity of FLB. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 1 briefly discusses the related 
literature. Section 2 presents the data used and descriptive statistics. Section 3 describes the 
econometric framework employed, and section 4 presents our estimation results. Section 5 
concludes. 
 
Literature Review 
 The effects of family firms on productivity are ambiguous because opposing effects are 
conceivable. In literature reviews by Le Breton-Miller and Miller (2009), and Chirico and Bau 
(2014), two contradictory perspectives on family enterprises have been proposed, sometimes called 
the ‘agency’ and ‘stewardship’ views. 
In the agency perspective, family members act on the basis of self-interest, and their conduct leads 
to a misalignment of objectives between those of family members and those of other firm actors 
(minority owners and firm stakeholders). Thus, enterprises run by families are exposed to specific 
forms of agency costs because the strategies of their owners are mainly oriented toward pursuing 
the private benefits of control (such as related-party transactions, special dividends, excessive 
compensation for family management, and the redistribution of rents from employees to family 
members, Shleifer and Vishny 1997). Additionally, family firms usually suffer from 
mismanagement due to the inefficient selection of executives, who are frequently chosen from 
among family members rather than from a pool of external and talent managers. One related aspect 
is that family firms, especially if they are run by second-generation or later family managers, 
frequently underperform with respect to firms run by founding owners (Villalonga and Amit, 2006). 
Concerning our key variable, labour productivity, we may posit that the long-term objectives that 
characterize family firms manifest their role in the production process. The objective of ensuring 
the long-term survival of their businesses may induce family firms to forego investment strategies 
that could enhance productivity but that might also yield uncertain returns. Concentration of 
ownership, which produces limited risk diversification (Demsetz and Lehn, 1985; Michelacci and 
Schivardi, 2013), characterizes small, closely held firms that prefer less risky activities because 
“business failure may imply the loss of all returns”, as shown by Gomez-Meja et al. (2001). Such 
caution may hinder adequate investments in R&D and discourage the introduction of productivity-
enhancing technologies (Barth et al. 2005). 
Second, neither the level of capital nor its use may be homogenous across firms because the output 
contributions of inputs might differ in family and non-family firms. Demsetz (1983, p. 378) argues 
that the owner-manager is “guided by utility maximization, not simply the pursuit of profit” and that 
the owner-manager may finance his amenities by misallocating resources from profitable projects to 
non-pecuniary consumption. Thus, as shown by Barbera and Moores (2013) using a sample of 
privately held Australian small and medium-sized firms, capital elasticities in the production 
processes of family enterprises might be significantly lower than in non-family firms. 
Another potential source of inefficiency is the quality of management itself. Bloom and van Reenen 
(2007), in one of the most comprehensive studies of management practices and productivity, find 
that half of the substantial cross-country differences in the quality of management disappear when 
they control for the greater incidence of family firms managed by descendants of founders and the 
intensity of product market competition. These results are confirmed in the Italian case by 
Cucculelli and Mannarino (2008), who find that family firms run by second-generation and later 
family managers frequently underperform compared with firms run by founding owners. 
However, economic research has also identified positive aspects of family firms. In these 
enterprises, less efficient use of capital may be balanced by a more efficient use of labour, as shown 
by Barbera and Moores (2013). As this study suggests, various explanations for this finding are 
possible. The high level of ‘emotional involvement’ of family members may enhance 
communication, the transmission of tacit knowledge and the mobilization of human resources 
(Tagiuri and Davis, 1996). Goffee and Scase (1985) argue that family firms encourage informal, 
adaptive and flexible work practices, and, as confirmed by Kirchhoff and Kirchhoff (1987), there 
may be a significant positive correlation between productivity and the use of family labour, both 
paid and unpaid[ii]. 
Other positive effects on productivity are suggested by the stewardship perspective, which portrays 
family firms as organizations in which family owners are ‘stewards’ of the firm. As shown 
by Mueller and Phillipon (2011, p. 219), family firms are ‘a natural response’ in countries where the 
climate of working relations is hostile. As the authors write, “due to their longer time horizons, 
family owners may have a comparative advantage at sustaining implicit labour contracts, which 
may be reciprocated by workers with cooperative behavior.” Furthermore, Habberson et al. (2003) 
consider a set of idiosyncratic traits, such as the firm’s potential for trust, leadership development 
and human resource policies, that create a pool of resources and capabilities unique to the family 
unit. 
This brief discussion suggests that the relationship between family involvement and productivity 
performance is complex and multifaceted. Our main hypothesis, tested below, is that positive 
idiosyncratic traits of family firms, such as trust and superior human resource policies, are activated 
when favourable firm-level institutional settings emerge. Such settings may be forged by 
agreements recommended by the European Commission (2011) that adapt wages and working 
conditions to the specific needs of companies and their employees.  
It is known that “a standard argument in favour of decentralized vs. centralized bargaining 
structures is that plant-level agreements allow to link more closely productivity and pay. This 
should improve the allocation of labour by both providing better incentives within the firm and 
promoting reallocation of workers across firms” (Boeri, 2014, p. 16). Firm-level bargaining is 
attractive for various reasons, summarized by Andréasson (2014) as follows. First, in local 
negotiations, enterprises have more precise knowledge of the characteristics and abilities of their 
workers than central negotiators. Second, FLB offers greater discretion in wage setting, enabling 
enterprises to adopt incentives that enhance firm productivity through wage premiums offered for 
recruiting, motivating and retaining employees. Third, when job tasks become more heterogeneous, 
centralized agreements become increasingly inefficient, whereas FLB allows firms greater 
functional flexibility and leaves more space for agreements on issues such as training and 
outsourcing as economic conditions change. 
We expect that these general motivations will be especially valid for family firms and that 
enterprises under family governance will achieve significant labour productivity gains—greater 
than those achieved by their non-family counterparts—when they adopt firm-level bargaining. 
Family firms might exploit their competitive advantages that arise from deeper knowledge of their 
workers, greater ability to discipline and monitor family managers and greater capacity to exploit 
fruitful opportunities provided by bargaining flexibility. Additionally, small family firms, which 
usually do not make substantial use of external sources of recruitment, such as employment 
agencies, may take advantage of wage incentives negotiated under FLB to recruit and retain their 
employees (Deshpande and Golhar, 1994). 
In summary, the agency theory and the stewardship view have proposed opposite predictions on the 
role of family involvement. Our working hypothesis is that family control and management may be 
of strategic importance when firms negotiate agreements with their workforces on issues such as 
performance-related pay, employee training and team-based production systems. Indeed, within 
human resource management practices, these issues involve strategic choices adopted through firm-
level bargaining that may activate the competitive advantages of family firms that the stewardship 
theory emphasizes. This paper attempts to bridge the gap between the two views (agency and 
stewardship theories) and takes a step forward by showing the potential effectiveness of FLB for 
family firm efficiency. 
In testing these hypotheses, we assume that institutional characteristics of the setting in which 
family firms operate are relevant, as discussed next. 
 
The Italian institutional setting  
In Italy, governance structures are founded on family capitalism (more than 75 percent of 
listed firms are family controlled), the predominance of small businesses (the incidence of firms 
with less than 10 employees is 14 percentage points above the European average), the 
widespread use of pyramidal groups (family-controlled pyramids represented 20 percent of 
market capitalization at the end of the 1990s) and the limited role of banks and other financial 
companies, which do not hold significant stakes in industrial companies (Bianco and Casavola, 
1999, Aganin and Volpin, 2005, Bianco et al. 2013). Furthermore, the lack of supervisory boards 
or work council-type bodies leads to the absence of formal rights of employees to influence key 
managerial strategies. Thus, a central role is ultimately assigned to family governance, and the 
impact of firm level bargaining aimed at increasing the flexibility of working conditions and 
wages appears particularly relevant for labour relations. Therefore, a study of the Italian case 
provides an opportunity to determine the role that actors’ decisions play in shaping the form and 
use of FLB, whereas related literature has poorly explored the conditional role of different modes 
of governance in implementing local agreements between employers and employees (Poutsma, 
Blasi and Kruse, 2012).  
Within the Italian context, we examine whether family leadership, through its involvement in 
FLB, manifests a form of commitment to labour and wage agreements oriented towards 
productivity improvements rather than extracting resources for family aims (Le Breton-Miller 
and Miller, 2009).  
Since the early 1990s, Italy has been characterized by a two-tier bargaining regime, set up by 
the July 1993 Agreement. Under this regime, first-level contracts are intended to guarantee the 
purchasing power of wages, whereas decentralized bargaining distributes wage premiums, 
linked to productivity or firm results. In addition, decentralized bargaining (at the firm or 
territory level) addresses several other matters, such as working time, employee training, labour 
organization and union relations. In these negotiations, which may foster reorganization and 
innovation of productive processes, employees and management are expected to co-operate in 
acquiring all of the specific and detailed information needed to evaluate the firm’s economic 
performance and its prospective competitiveness. 
 
 Data and Descriptive Statistics 
Data 
Our empirical analysis is based on information obtained through the Employer and Employee 
Surveys (RIL) conducted by ISFOL in 2007 and 2010 on a representative sample of partnerships 
and limited liability firms that operated in the non-agricultural private sector. The ISFOL-RIL 
surveys collect a rich set of information about employment composition, personnel organization, 
industrial relations and other workplace characteristics.  
In 2010, an additional section was inserted into the RIL questionnaire to collect information about 
some characteristics of corporate governance, ownership/control and management structure. We 
define family firms (FF) as those controlled or owned by an individual or family, and we define 
non-family firms (NFF) as all other firms[iii]. Thus, we created a dummy variable that equals one if a 
firm is owned/controlled by a family (family firms, FF) and 0 otherwise (non-family firms, NFF). 
Furthermore, in the ISFOL-RIL questionnaire, each firm was asked whether the person who 
manages the enterprise is i) a member of the family that owns or controls the company, ii) a 
manager hired from inside the company, or iii) a manager hired from outside the company. We thus 
divided family firms into two types of firms: family management (FM) (answer i) and non-family 
management (NFM) (answers ii and iii)[iv]. Finally, we selected the sub-sample of firms not 
involved in mergers and acquisitions to limit our analysis to enterprises whose ownership and 
control structure remained unchanged during the observation period. 
With respect to our key explanatory variable, in the RIL questionnaire, each firm was asked 
whether a firm-level bargaining agreement (FLB) had been adopted. Such firm-level agreements in 
Italy cover several issues, such as working time, variable pay, employee training, labour 
organization and union relations. Thus, we created a dummy variable that indicates the presence or 
absence of an FLB contract for each year under study. 
In addition, we collected information on the occupational composition of the labour force within the 
firm (executives, blue-collar workers and white-collar workers), gender, type of contract (long-
term/short-term) and other firm strategies (innovation and export). We also controlled for the 
sectors and regions (NUTS 1) in which firms were located.  
To link information concerning workers’ characteristics to indicators of firm performance and 
accounting variables, a sub-sample of the RIL dataset was merged with balance-sheet information 
from the AIDA archives.  
The longitudinal RIL-AIDA merged sample was then restricted to those limited liability companies 
that disclosed detailed accounts in accordance with the scheme of the 4th Directive CEE. We also 
excluded firms with fewer than five employees to retain only firms characterized by a minimum 
level of organizational structure. This criterion for selection, which is consistent with the focus of 
our paper, allowed us to avoid excluding all micro-firms (those with fewer than 10 employees) 
whose incidence in Italy, as stated above, is the highest in Europe; in 2008, their share of total value 
added was approximately 33 percent, well above the European average of 19 percent (Bank of Italy, 
2013, p. 5). Furthermore, we excluded firms with missing data for the key variables. Therefore, the 
sample that we used in the first specifications was an unbalanced panel of approximately 7,700 
firms for 2007 and 2010[v]. Note that our longitudinal dataset, which contains information for two 
different years, is strongly unbalanced as the large number of missing observations does not permit 
us to follow many firms for more than a single year. In addition, the time-invariant characteristics of 
our key binary variables (family firm, family management and firm-level bargaining) severely 
undermine our ability to use the fixed effect estimator, as we will discuss below. 
The AIDA data set provides information on our dependent variable, the labour productivity (the 
value added per employee, taken in log). This indicator is the single most frequently computed 
productivity statistic, for its ease of measurement and readability. Labour productivity, based on 
value added, reflects not only the influence of changes in capital inputs but also technical, 
organizational and efficiency changes. This indicator is also important as a reference statistic in 
wage bargaining (OECD, 2001, p 15), which is one of the key issues included in FLB. 
The AIDA data set also provides information on an important control, the log of capital per 
employee.  
Finally, we collected information from AIDA to set up our instrumental variable quantile regression 
approach, which is discussed thoroughly below. This instrument is a measure of the sales volatility 
that firms have experienced in the past (the standard deviation of sales over the 1998-2000 period) 
that we transformed into a binary variable in accordance with the quantile treatment effect 
technique (Abadie et al., 2002). Information on lagged sales volatility, used as an instrument for 
FLB (1 when this volatility is above the median value recorded in the firm’s industry and 0 
otherwise), is available only for a restricted sub-sample of firms (approximately 4,700 observations 
in the total pooled sample). Detailed definitions of the variables are reported in Table A1. 
 
Descriptive statistics 
Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics for the pooled sample for 2007-2010. We find that 
approximately 80 percent of firms are owned by families (FF) and that the large majority of 
these firms, 92 percent, are under family management (FM). Thus, the main characteristic of the 
Italian case, in both the manufacturing and service sectors, is not the prevalence of family-owned 
firms, which is common in many other countries, but the predominance of family-managed 
firms, which represent only a minority in other economies (one-third in Spain and only one-
fourth in France and Germany; Accetturo et al. 2013). 
The data reported in Table 1 also show the limited diffusion of FLB (15 percent of the entire 
sample), a higher diffusion (29 percent) among non-family firms (NFF), a lower diffusion (11 
percent) among family firms under family management (FM), and a diffusion of 17 percent 
among family firms under external management (NFM). Interestingly, there is a correspondence 
between FLB diffusion and the magnitude of sales volatility that firms experienced in the past. 
Indeed, the highest value of sales volatility (standard deviation of log sales) is among NFF firms 
(13.55), which are the firms that adopt FLB in the largest numbers[vi]. 
[Table 1 about here] 
Additional information concerning the statistical significance of the difference between the 
means (or proportions) of the two main groups (i.e., FF and NFF) is reported in the Appendix 
(Table A.2).  
In terms of labour productivity, measured by the log of value added per employee, NFF firms are 
more efficient (11.02) than FF firms (10.74) (see Table 1). This difference (-0.28) is significant at 
the 1 percent level (Table A.2). In terms of representation in international markets as exporters, the 
difference between FF and NFF is negative (-0.02) but not significant. Other information on 
innovation shows that disparities between FF and NFF are not significant. Interestingly, we find 
that significant differences among these two groups relate to workforce characteristics. Thus, the 
proportion of executives in FF firms is half of that recorded in non-family firms (-0.03 less than 
NFF), and the former hire fewer white-collar employees (a difference of -0.11) but make more use 
of fixed-term contracts (+0.01). All these differences are significant at the 1 percent level (see Table 
A.2). 
Finally, the sectoral distribution of firms shows some significant differences between the two 
groups, with a higher presence of FF firms in Constructions (+ 0.13) and Textiles (+0.15). On the 
contrary, we observe a lower presence of FF in Intermediation and other business services (-0.05), 
in Transports and Communications (-0.03) and in Education and other personal services (-0.04). 
In summary, the overall portrait of family firms is unambiguous: they are less successful in terms 
of per capita value added, more active in traditional sectors and not heavily involved in incentive 
strategies or in high-quality personnel policies determined through bargaining with their workforce 
in firm-level negotiations. 
Figure 1 depicts the distribution of labour productivity (log of value added per employee) among 
FLB firms (those that adopt firm-level bargaining) and other firms (those that do not adopt firm-
level bargaining). The comparison is performed for all sub-samples, distinguished on the basis of 
ownership and management. We find that the distribution for FLB firms is slightly to the right of 
that for other firms (firms without FLB) for all typologies of family firms. By contrast, among non-
family firms, there are more firms without FLB (other firms) at the end of the upper tail. These 
initial comparisons encouraged us to further explore possible differences in the relationships 
between FLB and enterprise performance among family and non-family firms. 
 
Econometric strategy and results  
Estimation strategy 
In this section, we present the empirical strategy used to estimate the role of family-involved 
firms. We begin our empirical analysis by estimating the relationship between labour productivity 
and governance variables. In particular, the relationship between labour productivity and family 
ownership and control may be formalized by a production function augmented by a dummy variable 
that captures the role of family ownership and by including a set of controls for firm characteristics 
and workforce composition.  
We first estimate the following equation:  
(1) 𝑙𝑛 (
𝑃
𝐿
)
𝑖,𝑡
= 𝛼 ∙ 𝑙𝑛 (
𝐾
𝐿
)
𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛽 ∙ 𝐷𝐹𝐹,𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜗 ∙ 𝐹𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜇𝑠 + 𝛾𝑗 + 𝜂𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡     𝑡= 2007,2010 
where ln (
𝑃
𝐿
)
𝑖,𝑡
 is the (log of) valued added per employee, is the (log of) physical capital 
per employee, and DFF represents a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the firm is owned 
and/or controlled by a family and zero otherwise (1). The parameter associated with DFF indicates 
whether firms owned/controlled by a family are more or less productive than non-family firms are. 
Put differently, the coefficient on DFF may be interpreted as the labour productivity gap between the 
two categories of firms. The vector Fit denotes controls for firm characteristics and workforce 
composition. The parameter s denotes sector-specific fixed effects, j denotes regional 
(NUTS1_level) fixed effects for macro-areas,  represents year fixed effects, and  is an error 
term capturing the idiosyncratic component of labour productivity. 
Furthermore, we restrict our analysis to family firms and include among the regressors a dummy 
variable, DFM, that equals 1 if the firm is managed by a member of the owner/controlling family and 
zero otherwise. Thus, we estimate the following equation: 
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Analogously to equation (1), the coefficient on DFM indicates whether firms managed by a 
family member are more or less efficient, in terms of labour productivity, than all family firms. 
With respect to other controls, we replicate the estimation strategy of equation 1. 
In a further step, our key aim is to estimate the effect of FLB on labour productivity for different 
groups of firms; thus, we include a dummy variable that captures the incidence of FLB, and we 
include all controls for firm characteristics and workforce composition. The following equation is 
estimated: 
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where FLB is a dummy variable indicating the presence of firm-level bargaining. 
We began with a pooled cross-section analysis of equations (1), (1’) and (2), controlling for time 
fixed effects (this OLS estimation is performed with clustered standard errors). We prefer pooled 
sample estimates because both the key explanatory dummy variables of equations (1) and (1’), that 
is, DFF and DFM, are time invariant. In addition, we analyse the between and within variation of 
FLB, our key explanatory dummy variable in equation (2). We find that 90.10 percent of firms that 
introduced FLB utilized this type of agreement during the full period covered by the panel (two 
years); this percentage increases to 98.13 percent for firms that never introduced FLB[vii]. In 
summary, FLB appears to be close to a time-invariant variable, and this seriously limits the use of 
fixed effect regressions (Cameron and Trivedi, 2010). 
However, we may address the importance of between-firm variability by taking into account the 
differing effects of FLB along the labour productivity distribution. We began with the classical 
Koenker and Basset (1978) estimator 
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where 𝛽 is the coefficient of interest, 𝜹 is a vector of coefficients for all control variables now 
included in the matrix 𝑿, 𝜏 is the specific conditional quantile to be estimated, and 𝜌𝜏 is the 
asymmetric loss function 𝜌𝜏(𝑢) = 1(𝑢 > 0) ∙ 𝜏|𝑢| + 1(𝑢 ≤ 0) ∙ (1 − 𝜏)|𝑢|. 
We estimated five quantile regressions, with 𝜏 = 0.1, 0.25, 0.5, 0.75 and 0.9. In addition, 
following Cameron and Trivedi (2010), we addressed heteroskedasticity by means of bootstrap 
standard errors (400 replications). The QR approach is more robust to outliers and provides 
information about the relationships between FLB and the dependent variables at different points of 
their conditional distribution. 
However, the Koenker and Basset (1978) estimator does not allow us to distinguish between 
causal effects and the spurious correlation between FLB and productivity that would typically arise 
if more productive firms are more likely to adopt FLB agreements. Thus, if unobserved factors 
influence the adoption of FLB, the estimated effect on productivity will be biased, and the issue of 
endogeneity must be taken into account. It may be argued that FLB is expensive to implement; it 
requires high-quality personnel policies and is more likely to be affordable for top-performing firms 
with highly capable managers (unobserved factor). Thus, higher-productivity firms may have a 
higher probability of adopting an FLB agreement. 
The volatility of sales at the firm level recorded in the past (over the 1998-2000 period) may be a 
valid instrument because it is a proxy for uncertainty. At the same time, using more than a one-year 
lag for this instrument, it is plausible to assume that it is orthogonal to labour productivity observed 
several years later. Thus, our instrument is expected to randomly affect sample firms and to 
influence the probability that firms will introduce FLB. The rationale behind this is that unstable 
market conditions, captured by sales volatility, increase the probability of decentralized agreements 
that typically enhance the flexibility of work organization and pay. This hypothesis receives support 
in the Italian case, where FLB, which includes negotiations on labour flexibility (job rotation, 
provision of training, changes in working hours), is most widely adopted by Italian companies as a 
strategy for adapting to fluctuating demand and as a response to variable and uncertain external 
pressures (see the EIRO report, 1997)[viii].  
A first objection is that previous sales volatility is potentially related to components of 
productivity. It is likely that different propensities to export and technology and innovation 
strategies may affect the volatility of sales. For instance, firms that export into geographically 
diverse markets or that operate in (high-tech) sectors and employ superior technology may 
experience sales volatilities that differ from those of other firms. However, in our estimates, we 
control for internationalization and innovation strategies related to technical change (process 
innovation) or market diversification (product innovation). In addition, the potential biases 
mentioned above are mitigated by including industry dummies that capture sector-specific 
technological factors.  
Furthermore, note that FLB also includes agreements on wage flexibility, such as provisions that 
link pay levels more closely to an enterprise’s performance. Thus, a second objection is that sales 
volatility may lead to a lower, not higher, adoption of FLB agreements because risk-averse 
employees will be reluctant to accept such agreements (Prendergast, 1999). However, in the Italian 
institutional setting, workers benefit from an incentive contract in any state of the world because the 
variable wage component is added to the base wage, set in the first sectoral level, and could be zero 
if the firm does not achieve positive results. Thus, risk-averse employees do not face a trade-off as a 
result of variable pay. 
The binary nature of our key explanatory variable (FLB) led us to address endogeneity via 
treatment effect techniques. As discussed below, under the instrumental variable quantile method 
used in our estimates, we compared the performance of both treated firms (firms adopting FLB 
schemes) and the control group (firms not adopting FLB schemes) to undertake a counterfactual 
analysis. 
With respect to our estimation strategy, we used two methods: i) the Quantile Treatment Effect 
Estimator of Abadie et al. (2002) (IVQR_AAI) and ii) the traditional Two-Stages Least Absolute 
Deviation Estimator (IVQR_2LAD) of Amemya (1982).  
The IVQR_AAI estimator, which allows us to examine the impact of FLB throughout the labour 
productivity distribution by resolving endogeneity issues, reveals some specific characteristics. The 
estimator is based on a binary endogenous variable and a binary instrument. Thus, we transformed 
the past sales’ volatility of the firm into a dummy variable that equals 1 when the firm experienced 
a volatility above the median volatility and 0 otherwise. The Abadie et al. (2002) conditional 
quantile treatment effects estimator (IVQR_AAI) can be applied only if both the endogenous 
variable and the instrument are binary variables. Furthermore, the causal effect is identified only for 
the sub-population of compliers. In our case, the compliers are firms whose estimated probability of 
adopting a FLB scheme is correlated with a higher estimated probability of having experienced past 
volatility of sales above the median. In our sample, these compliers are approximately 72 percent of 
all firms that adopt FLB. Following Abadie et al. (2002), the conditional quantile treatment effect 
for compliers can be estimated consistently by the following weighted quantile regressions: 
(4)  (𝛽𝐼𝑉
𝜏 , 𝜹𝐼𝑉
𝜏 ) = 𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑚𝑖𝑛 ∑ 𝑊𝑖,𝑡
𝐴𝐴𝐼 ∙ 𝜌𝜏 ∙ (𝑙𝑛 (
𝑃
𝐿
)
𝑖,𝑡
− 𝛽 ∙ 𝐹𝐿𝐵𝑖,𝑡 − 𝜹 ∙ 𝑿𝑖,𝑡)   
 (5)                       𝑊𝑖,𝑡
𝐴𝐴𝐼 = 1 −
𝐹𝐿𝐵𝑖,𝑡∙(1−𝑆𝑉𝑖,𝑡)
1−𝑃𝑟(𝑆𝑉=1|𝑿𝑖,𝑡)
−
(1−𝐹𝐿𝐵𝑖,𝑡)∙𝑆𝑉𝑖,𝑡
𝑃𝑟(𝑆𝑉=1|𝑿𝑖,𝑡)
 
where SV is the binary instrument for volatility of sales, and the weights 𝑊𝑖,𝑡
𝐴𝐴𝐼 combine the 
endogenous variable and the instrument [ix]. As stated above, the instrument is assumed to hit the 
sample firms randomly, and the conditional probability of having a volatility above the median, 
𝑃𝑟(𝑆𝑉 = 1|𝑿𝑖,𝑡), is estimated by means of a non-parametric regression, specifically, a local logit 
estimation, as suggested by Frölich and Melly (2013). 
The IVQR_2LAD estimator consists of using the fitted values, obtained from estimates 
performed in a first step, and then inserting the fitted values for FLB as a covariate to yield the 
IVQR_2LAD estimator of 𝑙𝑛 (
𝑃
𝐿
)
𝑖,𝑡
 in a second step. In our case, as noted above, the first step is a 
probit regression of FLB (our endogenous binary variable) on the binary instrument (sales volatility, 
SV) at the firm level. 
(6) 𝑃(𝐹𝐿𝐵𝑖,𝑡 = 1|𝑆𝑉𝑖,𝑡 , 𝑿𝒊,𝒕) = 𝚽(𝝃 ∙ 𝑆𝑉𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜹 ∙ 𝑿𝑖,𝑡) 
where 𝑿𝑖,𝑡 are the firm-level controls mentioned above.  
To obtain consistent standard errors, we bootstrapped them in both the first-stage and second-
stage regressions (Arias et al. 2001; Bosio, 2009). Notice, however, that this approach relies on the 
symmetry of the composite error obtained in the second stage (see Wooldridge, 2010). Furthermore, 
Chernozhukov and Hansen (2005) show that this estimate is not consistent when the coefficients 
differ across quantiles, and it is precisely in that case that the quantile regression method is of 
interest (see also Melly, 2005 and Bosio, 2009). For this reason, we retain the IVQR_2LAD 
estimator only as an IV conditional median estimator that permits us to show the significance of the 
instrument (sales volatility) in the first stage. 
 
Results  
Labour productivity and family-influenced firms 
Table 2 presents OLS and quantile estimates that permit us to verify the role of family firms on 
labour productivity, obtained by introducing as a key regressor the dummy variable DFF, as 
indicated in equation (1). The results we obtain show that the coefficient associated with the dummy 
variable DFF is negative and significant. Both OLS and quantile estimates also control for other firm 
and employee characteristics. In the OLS estimates, we find that family-owned firms are, on 
average, 20.8 percent less efficient in terms of labour productivity than their non-family 
counterparts (Table 2). We also restrict the analysis to the FF sub-sample and test the presence of a 
productivity gap between family-managed and other family firms with managers hired from 
outside, as we explain in equation (1’)[x]. For the sub-sample of family firms, our results (not 
reported here for reasons of space) show that family management negatively affects labour 
productivity by -9.8 percent. 
Using quantile regression (QR), we can also examine the effect of family ownership along different 
points of the productivity distribution.  
[Insert Table 2] 
 
In Table 2, we observe that the coefficients for FF are negative, statistically significant at the 1 
percent level and increasing across the productivity distribution in the range from -0.15 in the 10th 
quantile to -0.29 in the 90th quantile. These results suggest that Italian firms that are owned and 
controlled by families are less productive than non-family firms, particularly high performers (-29 
percent), confirming that owners often pursue family aims and private benefits of control[xi].  
With respect to other firm characteristics, we find, as expected, a positive association of labour 
productivity with the capital stock per capita and, in line with other studies of Italian firms (see Hall 
et al. 2009), with the propensity to export and firm size.  
We also control for firm age, which may be related to the quality of management and firm 
performance (see, among others, Levesque and Minniti, 2006). Opposite effects are also 
conceivable. First, it is likely that ageing enhances experience and competence, induces the 
implementation of routines and allows management to improve over time, as recently found for the 
Italian case (Cucculelli et al. 2014). However, ageing can negatively affect firm performance, 
inducing inertia, process rigidities, reluctance to innovate and obsolescence of initial endowments 
(Agrawal and Gort, 2002). Furthermore, firm ageing might be associated with a higher probability 
that a firm’s founder is no longer present in the firm and that the enterprise’s control has passed to 
his descendants, which is usually destructive to firm value (Villalonga and Amit, 2006)[xii]. Our 
results suggest that the positive aspect dominates the negative one, at least for median and best-
performing firms (Table 2), whereas for other quantiles, no significant coefficients are obtained.  
The estimations also control for worker heterogeneity, including a number of other potential 
determinants of productivity, such as the socioeconomic characteristics of individuals (e.g., gender) 
and three occupational groups (managers/supervisors, white-collar workers and blue-collar 
workers). The heterogeneity of workers (differentiated by gender, tenure and skills) may influence 
the relationships we test, as confirmed by our results. We find that employment position plays a 
role; the coefficients for executives and white-collar workers are positive and significant across the 
entire distribution relative to the omitted category, blue-collar workers. A plausible explanation for 
this finding is that managerial and more highly skilled employees are more important determinants 
of productivity than are blue-collar workers.  
We also obtain a negative coefficient for the effect of fixed-term workers on labour productivity, 
but the QR analysis reveals evidence of heterogeneous effects. The negative coefficients for fixed-
term contracts are significant across the entire productivity distribution with an absolute magnitude 
that decreases at higher quantiles. The higher coefficient at the lower end of the distribution 
suggests that especially in low-performing firms that use temporary contracts as a cost-cutting 
strategy, these forms of job instability reduce investment in training and workers’ motivations, 
ultimately undermining productivity growth (Belot, Boone and van Ours, 2007). 
Finally, the estimates in Table 2 appear to confirm that lower productivity gains are achieved when 
the proportion of women in the workforce is higher. This finding is in line with other studies that 
find that female employees, on average, prefer activities that allow for greater flexibility between 
job and family and feature less interdependence with other workers, rendering female employees 
less involved in participative, more efficient work forms (Zwick, 2004). 
All estimates are obtained by including time, sector and regional (NUTS) dummies to control for 
time-varying, sector-specific factors and geographical disparities that are likely to influence the 
dependent variables and cannot be captured by the controls included in our analysis.  
 
Labour productivity and FLB: OLS and QR estimates  
With respect to the role of firm-level bargaining, we briefly present the OLS and QR estimates 
(Tables 3-6) before focusing on the IV estimation (Tables 7-10) that corrects for endogeneity bias. 
All results reported in these tables (3-10) are obtained by including the same control variables used 
in the previous estimates. We also reinsert worker characteristics and the same sector and regional 
(NUTS) dummies of our previous estimates. 
With respect to our key variable, the OLS results reported in Table 3 for the entire sample suggest 
that FLB is positively related to changes in productivity. In our QR results, the point estimates of 
FLB are found to be positive and statistically significant across the distribution, although at 
different levels of significance and with higher coefficients at the highest quantiles. Analogous 
results are obtained by replicating our estimation strategy for the FF and FM sub-samples (see 
Tables 4 and 5, respectively), although for the 25th quantile, the coefficient for FLB is not 
significant for the FM firms. This finding implies that family-involved firms, in terms of both 
ownership and active management, tend to exploit some of the advantages of firm-level 
negotiations. In contrast, as shown in Table 6, non-family firms (NFF) do not appear to achieve 
significant improvements in labour productivity as a result of bargaining with their workforces. 
Indeed, with the exception of the 75th quantile, we obtained no significant coefficients for FLB at 
the median value and at other points in the productivity distribution.  
[Insert Table 3], [Insert Table 4], [Insert Table 5], [Insert Table 6] 
 
The findings for the NFF sub-sample confirm some major criticisms of the bargaining setting and 
practices observed in Italy, where the bargaining setting has come under pressure in recent years. 
For instance, some unions have argued that the system should be more flexible and better suited to 
respond more effectively and rapidly to specific and changing conditions faced by individual firms. 
Other workers’ representatives have cited long delays in reaching agreements, which are often 
signed months after old agreements have expired (European Trade Union Institute, 2014). These 
critical observations are likely to mostly concern firms that lack a controlling family owner, are 
large and characterized by slow reactivity to change and operate in more “confrontational” 
environments with bitter labour conflicts. By contrast, family-controlled firms that can more easily 
ensure the implementation of FLB exploit the advantages of company agreements that stipulate 
greater flexibility and closer connections with the firm’s workforce. 
IV estimates  
Controlling for endogeneity confirms the positive and significant role of FLB on productivity and 
increases its measured impact. More precisely, we observe higher positive coefficients for FLB on 
the productivity distributions for both the entire sample and the FF and FM sub-samples (see Tables 
7, 8 and 9, respectively). The IVQR_AAI estimates for FF firms (Table 8) show that the coefficient 
for FLB remains within the range of 0.433 (the median value) to 0.609 (Q10th). For the FM firms, 
the range is between 0.407 and 0.582 (median and Q90th, respectively). 
We also show the results obtained using the IVQR_2LAD method (reported in the last column of 
Tables 7-9). This estimator enables us to obtain the conditional median result (Chernozhukov and 
Hansen, 2005 and Melly 2005) and test the statistical significance of the instrument obtained in the 
first stage (see Table A.3). The validity of our strategy is confirmed by the strong correlation 
between the endogenous variable (FLB) and our instrument (sales volatility). The correlation has 
the expected sign and is significant at the 1 percent and 5 percent levels for the entire sample and 
for the FF and FM sub-samples (Table A3, Appendix). Our results appear to confirm that our 
instrumental variable is valid[xiii] and helps to reduce the downward bias due to measurement errors 
(Griliches and Hausman, 1986). 
For both the entire sample and the FF firms (Tables 7 and 8), we find a “U-shaped” relationship 
between FLB and the dependent variable (the magnitude of the coefficient decreases as we move 
from the lowest quantile to the median quantile and increases again in the 90th quantile). These 
findings suggest that especially for low and high performers, firm-level agreements provide 
incentives and suitable labour flexibility arrangements that improve enterprise performance.  
By rerunning the estimates for the FM group (Table 9), we find that FLB remains significant at the 
1 percent level, with point estimates that are lower than we found for the FF sample in all quantiles 
except the Q90th. All of these findings were obtained by controlling for a wide set of firm and 
worker characteristics as well as time, sector and regional effects, which were also controlled for in 
the OLS and QR estimations, as discussed above. 
Finally, Table 10 shows the results for non-family firms. For this sub-sample, we obtain significant 
effects of FLB only for the Q10th and the Q75th quantiles, whereas in the remainder of the 
distribution, the insignificant effects obtained using OLS and conventional QR estimators (see 
Table 6) are confirmed. Additionally, note that for the NFF group, the correction introduced using 
the IVQR_2LAD method is not significant[xiv] (Table A3, Appendix).  
[Table 7], [Table 8], [Table 9], [Table 10] 
To summarize, one plausible interpretation of the above results is that FLB activates the advantages 
of family involvement, enabling the achievement of positive outcomes through agreements on 
labour and wage flexibility. Indeed, it is conceivable that family owners who sign firm-level 
contracts may seek the consolidation of their market positions through investment in cooperative 
relations with their workforces. Thus, negotiations regarding labour flexibility and wage incentives 
may reveal distinctive features of firms that are less motivated by self-interest and less prone to 
extract resources in the pursuit of personal aims. Such firms are likely to elicit greater effort from 
subordinates, obtain higher commitments from workers and achieve higher firm performance. In 
addition, it is conceivable that family owners with large ownership stakes have greater incentives to 
bear the costs of active labour relations. By contrast, this activism is less relevant for non-family 
firms in which, in conformity with Bertrand and Mullainathan (2003), hired managers tend to prefer 
a “quiet life” and are less likely to engage in monitoring and supervisory activities.  
 
Conclusions  
The literature on family businesses requires very detailed data and, as suggested by Bertrand and 
Schoar (2006, p. 95), may benefit from microeconomic studies that proceed on a country-by-
country basis and enhance our understanding of the nexus between families and firms. 
This paper has attempted to take a step in that direction. Its contribution to the ongoing debate in 
family firm research is to reconcile two distinct, opposing views. The first, grounded in agency 
theory, views family owners as self-serving at the expense of the efficient functioning and success 
of their companies. The second, based on the stewardship of loyal family owners, views a family 
business as a favourable setting for the enactment of strategic policies that positively affect firm 
efficiency. 
This study has empirically tested these opposing views using labour productivity as a measure of 
Italian firm performance rather than profitability or firm value, which are used in most related 
works. First, based on comparative descriptive analyses and OLS and quantile estimations, our 
results confirm the predictions of the first view, indicating that the presence of family owners and 
family managers is unambiguously negatively associated with gains in labour productivity. 
Additionally, we find that taking into account the diversity of ownership and management permits a 
better understanding of the heterogeneity of Italian firms. 
Second, in testing whether firm-level bargaining may help to reverse the previous negative results, 
our study provides support for the stewardship view. In particular, IV estimates permit us to 
attenuate endogeneity problems and show a positive effect of decentralized agreements on the 
productivity of family-involved firms. We suggest that family members, who play an active role in 
day-to-day decisions and design appropriate incentives such as those formalized in firm-level 
bargaining, attach greater importance to the future prospects of the enterprise. We find that the 
ability to exploit opportunities offered by local agreements with workers positively and significantly 
affects the productivity of family firms but not non-family firms. In family companies, FLB, which 
includes training programmes and profit-sharing arrangements, acts as a signal that reveals a 
family’s strategic commitment to a firm’s competitiveness, which is likely to benefit all 
stakeholders, including employees, in accordance with the “stewardship” view. Thus, a family may 
provide “the springboard for a form of firm specific organizational capital known as family social 
capital” (Schulze and Gedajlovic, 2010, p. 196). 
The relevance of this result goes beyond the specific Italian case because our findings help to 
identify the “microeconomic mechanism” that potentially helps family businesses to be as 
productive as other firms. In particular, this paper contributes to previous literature by showing that 
human resource management practices, which are established in negotiations at the firm level, may 
exert a sizeable effect on family firms in which reputation and long-term survival are the main 
concerns.  The broad theoretical implications of our empirical study are that family ownership and 
involvement may be an “effective organizational structure” (Anderson and Reeb, 2003) when 
family leaders make strategic commitments to their employees (as shown in our case through FLB). 
This paper contributes to narrowing the distance between opposing theoretical views on family 
firms and provides a rationale to integrate components of agency and stewardship perspectives.  
The clear political message is that enhanced implementation of agreements regarding multiple and 
complementary human resource management practices (extensive employee training, team-based 
production systems, performance related pay) may partly mitigate the slowdown in Italian 
productivity growth experienced over the last several decades. The recently proposed changes to the 
two-tier system of bargaining, which give a greater role to negotiations at the company level on 
such issues as working time and wage flexibility, might improve labour productivity and reduce the 
gap with major international competitors (European Trade Union Institute, 2014). Thus, 
full implementation of the bargaining rules recommended by the European Commission appears to 
be a valid means of improving both family enterprise performance and the Italian system of 
corporate governance. 
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Notes 
[i] Productivity measurements permit to take into account technology, “the currently known ways of 
converting resources into outputs desired by the economy” and efficiency, to identify whether “a 
production process has achieved the maximum amount of output that is physically achievable with 
current technology, and given a fixed amount of inputs”  (OECD, 2001, p.11). The measure of firm 
productivity we use is labour productivity based on value added, which is important as a reference 
statistic in wage bargaining (see the subsection on data below). 
[ii] Another study, based on a US sample of S&P 500 manufacturing firms, is that of Martikainen et 
al. (2009), who show that the role of family ownership has a positive effect on productive 
efficiency. The study shows that differences in output are not caused by differences in production 
technologies but more efficient use of labour and capital resources. 
[iii] We assumed that the same information holds for 2007. Therefore, both the FF and FM variables 
are time-invariant. 
[iv] We consider firms owned by families but run by external managers as distinct from firms 
owned and run by family members, whereas our data do not permit the separation of firms run by 
‘lone’ family founders from enterprises run by their heirs (i.e., inherited managers). 
[v] The RIL Survey sample of firms is stratified by size, sector, geographic area and legal form. 
Inclusion depends on firm size, measured by the total number of employees. This 
choice has required the construction of a ‘direct estimator’ to take into account differing 
probabilities of inclusion of firms belonging to specific strata. In particular, the direct 
estimator is defined for each sample unit (firm) as the inverse of the probability of inclusion in the 
sample. Using this estimator, the RIL sample reproduces all active firms for each stratum and, 
simultaneously, the total number of employees in a given stratum (size, sector and other 
characteristics). 
[vi] We also performed a chi_squared test of the independence of FLB and sales volatility after 
transforming the latter into a binary variable. The null hypothesis of independence was rejected at 
the 1 percent level of significance. 
[vii] Detailed results of the within and between variation analysis of FLB are available upon request. 
[viii] http://www.eurofound.europa.eu/eiro/1997/10/feature/it9710214f.htm. 
[ix]We estimated a modified version that allows for only positive weights. See Abadie et al. (2002) 
and Frölich and Melly (2013). 
[x] To save space we omit the table with results of equation (1’) and we only mention some key 
values of the coefficients. More detailed results are available upon request (see also note xi). 
[xi] Similar results are found when we consider heterogeneities in the subsample of family firms and 
estimate the role of family management, whose effect is negative and significant at the 1 percent 
level across the whole distribution. More detailed results for these estimates are available upon 
request. 
[xii] This effect may be relevant in our case because the ISFOL database does not permit us to 
distinguish between family firms run by founders from those run by their successors, and we cannot 
control for the identity of family managers. 
[xiii] As is well known, for instruments to be valid, orthogonality conditions must also be met. As 
regards this second property, one should note that we have only one instrument and one endogenous 
variable, so that the equation is perfectly identified, and no test is available to prove the 
orthogonality condition. According to the authors who propose the methods discussed above 
(Abadie et al., 2002; Frölich and Melly, 2010; 2013), instrument-error independence is plausible 
when the random assignment of the instrument can be plausibly justified. In our case, the standard 
deviation of sales is strictly related to uncertainty (Bloom, 2009), and conceivably, this volatility is 
randomly assigned to firms.   
[xiv] This result might be related to the small number of observations of non-family firms.  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1. Descriptive statistics: the pooled sample 2007-2010 
 
Whole sample FF 
FF 
NFF 
 FM management NFM 
 Mean St Dev Mean St Dev Mean St Dev Mean St Dev Mean St Dev 
           
FLB 0.15 0.35 0.11 0.31 0.11 0.31 0.17 0.38 0.29 0.45 
Ln (value added per employee) 10.79 0.56 10.74 0.53 10.73 0.53 10.84 0.56 11.02 0.62 
Ln(physical capital per employee) 10.00 1.63 9.99 1.58 9.99 1.56 10.03 1.78 10.05 1.85 
Ln(sales st.dev., 1998-2000) 13.17 1.35 13.07 1.30 13.06 1.30 13.26 1.41 13.55 1.43 
Workforce characteristics           
% executives 0.04 0.08 0.03 0.08 0.03 0.08 0.05 0.09 0.06 0.10 
% white collars 0.38 0.30 0.36 0.29 0.35 0.29 0.41 0.30 0.46 0.31 
% blue collars 0.58 0.31 0.61 0.30 0.61 0.30 0.53 0.32 0.48 0.33 
% women 0.34 0.28 0.33 0.28 0.33 0.28 0.35 0.28 0.36 0.27 
% fixed-term contracts 0.09 0.15 0.09 0.16 0.09 0.15 0.10 0.17 0.08 0.13 
Firm characteristics           
Firm age 25.21 16.53 25.09 15.87 24.98 15.74 26.27 17.44 25.70 19.02 
Process innovation 0.43 0.49 0.43 0.49 0.43 0.49 0.41 0.49 0.42 0.49 
Product innovation 0.51 0.50 0.51 0.50 0.51 0.50 0.49 0.50 0.52 0.50 
Export 0.29 0.45 0.28 0.45 0.28 0.45 0.25 0.43 0.30 0.46 
Size: 5 <  n of employees<15 0.43 0.50 0.47 0.50 0.48 0.50 0.40 0.49 0.28 0.45 
Size: 15 ≦n employees < 50 0.36 0.48 0.36 0.48 0.36 0.48 0.40 0.49 0.37 0.48 
Size: 50 ≦ n employees < 250 0.18 0.39 0.15 0.36 0.15 0.36 0.18 0.38 0.30 0.46 
Size: n of employees ≧250 0.02 0.14 0.01 0.11 0.01 0.10 0.02 0.15 0.06 0.23 
Regions (NUTS1)                     
North West 0.34 0.47 0.33 0.47 0.33 0.47 0.34 0.47 0.37 0.48 
North East 0.28 0.45 0.27 0.44 0.27 0.44 0.24 0.43 0.30 0.46 
Centre 0.21 0.41 0.21 0.41 0.21 0.41 0.19 0.40 0.19 0.40 
South 0.18 0.38 0.19 0.39 0.19 0.39 0.22 0.42 0.13 0.34 
Sectors                     
Textile, wearing apparel, food industry 0.14 0.35 0.15 0.36 0.15 0.36 0.12 0.32 0.11 0.32 
Other manufacturing, mining, utilities 0.35 0.48 0.35 0.48 0.36 0.48 0.25 0.43 0.34 0.47 
Constructions 0.12 0.32 0.13 0.34 0.13 0.34 0.13 0.33 0.05 0.23 
Trade, hotels, restaurants 0.14 0.35 0.14 0.35 0.14 0.34 0.14 0.35 0.14 0.35 
Transportation and communication 0.05 0.21 0.04 0.20 0.04 0.20 0.05 0.21 0.07 0.26 
Intermediation and other business services 0.10 0.30 0.09 0.29 0.09 0.28 0.13 0.34 0.14 0.35 
Education, health and private social services 0.11 0.31 0.10 0.30 0.09 0.29 0.19 0.39 0.13 0.34 
           
Observations 11979  9492  8745  662  2450  
           
Source: RIL-AIDA data; Note: descriptive statistics are performed with no sampling weights 
  
  
  
  
  
  
Figure 1. Labour productivity distribution according to  firm level bargaining (2007-2010) 
Family Firms Non-Family Firms 
  
Family Firms with Family Management Family Firms without Family Management 
  
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
  
  
  
  
Table 2. OLS and Quantile Regressions: Family Firms and Labour productivity 
 
Simultaneous Quantile estimates 
OLS 
 
Q10 Q25 Q50 Q75 Q90 
       
Family firms (DFF) -0.149*** -0.160*** -0.162*** -0.216*** -0.290*** -0.208*** 
 
(0.022) (0.014) (0.013) (0.013) (0.021) (0.015) 
% executives 0.176 0.459*** 1.060*** 1.389*** 1.810*** 0.958*** 
 
(0.114) (0.075) (0.086) (0.088) (0.111) (0.082) 
%white collars 0.366*** 0.398*** 0.433*** 0.520*** 0.640*** 0.472*** 
 
(0.026) (0.020) (0.022) (0.024) (0.033) (0.023) 
% women -0.510*** -0.471*** -0.441*** -0.421*** -0.414*** -0.444*** 
 
(0.028) (0.019) (0.020) (0.023) (0.038) (0.023) 
 % fixed-term contracts -0.579*** -0.473*** -0.365*** -0.258*** -0.159** -0.396*** 
 
(0.074) (0.041) (0.027) (0.034) (0.069) (0.038) 
Ln(firm seniority) 0.014 0.017** 0.015** 0.016*** 0.021* 0.013*  
 
(0.010) (0.008) (0.006) (0.006) (0.011) (0.008) 
Ln(physical capital per employee) 0.086*** 0.095*** 0.104*** 0.118*** 0.139*** 0.118*** 
 
(0.005) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.007) (0.004) 
Process innovation 0.054*** 0.019 0.011 0.000 -0.019 0.015 
 
(0.018) (0.014) (0.012) (0.012) (0.020) (0.011) 
Product innovation 0.022 0.009 -0.004 -0.013 -0.038** -0.003 
 
(0.015) (0.012) (0.011) (0.012) (0.016) (0.011) 
Export 0.087*** 0.071*** 0.059*** 0.063*** 0.063*** 0.064*** 
 
(0.018) (0.013) (0.010) (0.011) (0.017) (0.011) 
Ln(size) 0.054*** 0.039*** 0.020*** -0.006 -0.042*** 0.011* 
 
(0.007) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.009) (0.006) 
Year 2010 -0.102*** -0.063*** -0.043*** -0.052*** -0.047*** -0.064*** 
 
(0.015) (0.009) (0.011) (0.011) (0.017) (0.008) 
Constant 9.238*** 9.465*** 9.640*** 9.842*** 10.015*** 9.561*** 
 
(0.068) (0.046) (0.047) (0.056) (0.094) (0.050) 
NUTS1_level Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Sector Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R_2/PseudoR_2 0.181 0.183 0.189 0.203 0.218 0.306 
Observations 11979 
Notes: Clustered-Robust (OLS) and bootstrap standard errors with 400 replications (Quantile Regression) in parentheses. *** 
significant at .01 level; ** significant at .05 level; *significant at .10 level 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
Table  3. OLS and Quantile Regressions: FLB and Labour productivity (Whole Sample) 
 Simultaneous Quantile estimates 
OLS 
 Q10 Q25 Q50 Q75 Q90 
       
FLB 0.068*** 0.066*** 0.070*** 0.092*** 0.085*** 0.086*** 
 (0.020) (0.014) (0.011) (0.012) (0.024) (0.015) 
% executives 0.100 0.526*** 1.075*** 1.622*** 2.117*** 0.971*** 
 (0.082) (0.082) (0.089) (0.101) (0.149) (0.085) 
%white collars 0.418*** 0.454*** 0.490*** 0.568*** 0.724*** 0.531*** 
 (0.026) (0.019) (0.017) (0.020) (0.033) (0.022) 
% women -0.522*** -0.498*** -0.470*** -0.448*** -0.466*** -0.459*** 
 (0.037) (0.029) (0.023) (0.024) (0.028) (0.023) 
% fixed-term contracts -0.568*** -0.482*** -0.375*** -0.291*** -0.231*** -0.428*** 
 (0.062) (0.034) (0.031) (0.036) (0.057) (0.034) 
Ln(firm seniority) 0.009 0.013* 0.004 0.000 -0.002 (0.002) 
 (0.009) (0.007) (0.006) (0.005) (0.009) (0.008) 
Ln(physical capital per employee) 0.100*** 0.103*** 0.106*** 0.123*** 0.140*** 0.123*** 
 (0.005) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) 
Process innovation 0.047*** 0.030*** 0.015* 0.002 -0.004 0.019*  
 (0.016) (0.010) (0.009) (0.013) (0.013) (0.010) 
Product innovation 0.028** -0.001 -0.008 -0.019 -0.056*** -(0.008) 
 (0.012) (0.009) (0.008) (0.012) (0.016) (0.011) 
Export 0.062*** 0.066*** 0.050*** 0.058*** 0.038* 0.050*** 
 (0.018) (0.010) (0.007) (0.011) (0.019) (0.011) 
Ln(size) 0.070*** 0.046*** 0.028*** 0.005 -0.022** 0.026*** 
 (0.009) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.009) (0.006) 
Year 2010 -0.047*** -0.037*** -0.028*** -0.029*** -0.023 -0.028*** 
 (0.013) (0.009) (0.008) (0.010) (0.015) (0.008) 
Constant 8.824*** 9.166*** 9.436*** 9.572*** 9.736*** 9.242*** 
 (0.063) (0.044) (0.031) (0.036) (0.061) (0.046) 
NUTS1_level Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Sector Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R_2/PseudoR_2 0.185 0.182 0.186 0.196 0.205 0.291 
Observations 11979 
Notes: Clustered-Robust (OLS) and bootstrap standard errors with 400 replications (Quantile Regression) in 
parentheses.*** significant at .01 level; ** significant at .05 level; *significant at .10 level 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
 
 
 
 
Table 4. OLS and Quantile Regressions: FLB and Labour productivity in Family Firms 
 
Simultaneous Quantile estimates 
OLS 
 
Q10 Q25 Q50 Q75 Q90 
       
FLB 0.076*** 0.047*** 0.064*** 0.074*** 0.093*** 0.087*** 
 
(0.022) (0.018) (0.019) (0.017) (0.035) (0.017) 
% executives -0.054 0.275*** 0.595*** 0.987*** 1.330*** 0.616*** 
 
(0.118) (0.090) (0.100) (0.090) (0.182) (0.088) 
%white collars 0.345*** 0.388*** 0.433*** 0.486*** 0.572*** 0.426*** 
 
(0.033) (0.023) (0.018) (0.027) (0.041) (0.024) 
% women -0.486*** -0.454*** -0.423*** -0.410*** -0.408*** -0.430*** 
 
(0.037) (0.025) (0.023) (0.030) (0.042) (0.025) 
 % fixed-term contracts -0.548*** -0.462*** -0.359*** -0.237*** -0.204*** -0.396*** 
 
(0.077) (0.044) (0.035) (0.034) (0.059) (0.040) 
Ln (firm seniority) (0.012) 0.022*** 0.019** 0.027*** 0.030** 0.023*** 
 
(0.013) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.015) (0.009) 
Ln(physical capital per employee) 0.095*** 0.104*** 0.102*** 0.119*** 0.138*** 0.121*** 
 
(0.006) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.006) (0.004) 
Process innovation 0.048*** 0.02 0.017 0.001 -0.015 0.026** 
 
(0.016) (0.015) (0.012) (0.013) (0.018) (0.012) 
Product innovation 0.021 0.011 -0.009 -0.008 -0.026 -0.005 
 
(0.019) (0.014) (0.013) (0.013) (0.018) (0.012) 
Export 0.100*** 0.086*** 0.063*** 0.076*** 0.082*** 0.087*** 
 
(0.020) (0.014) (0.013) (0.016) (0.023) (0.012) 
Ln(size) 0.050*** 0.035*** 0.023*** -0.002 -0.036*** 0.013*  
 
(0.010) (0.007) (0.005) (0.006) (0.009) (0.007) 
Year 2010 -0.113*** -0.074*** -0.049*** -0.053*** -0.046*** -0.074*** 
 
(0.017) (0.011) (0.008) (0.009) (0.017) (0.009) 
Constant 9.006*** 9.195*** 9.460*** 9.558*** 9.650*** 9.269*** 
 
(0.059) (0.051) (0.047) (0.053) (0.099) (0.051) 
NUTS1_level Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Sector Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R_2/PseudoR_2 0.193 0.184 0.178 0.181 0.184 0.298 
Observations 9492 
Notes: Clustered-Robust (OLS) and bootstrap standard errors with 400 replications (Quantile Regression) in parentheses.*** 
significant at .01 level; ** significant at .05 level; *significant at .10 level 
  
 
Table 5. OLS and Quantile Regressions: FLB and Labour productivity in Family Firms with Family Management 
 
Simultaneous Quantile estimates 
OLS 
 
Q10 Q25 Q50 Q75 Q90 
       
FLB 0.072*** 0.034* 0.057*** 0.069*** 0.109*** 0.077*** 
 
(0.025) (0.020) (0.020) (0.017) (0.031) (0.018) 
% executives -0.117 0.183** 0.528*** 0.884*** 1.038*** 0.481*** 
 
(0.096) (0.086) (0.095) (0.110) (0.175) (0.087) 
%white collars 0.358*** 0.400*** 0.436*** 0.491*** 0.595*** 0.427*** 
 
(0.040) (0.029) (0.023) (0.025) (0.041) (0.025) 
% women -0.496*** -0.457*** -0.422*** -0.404*** -0.397*** -0.426*** 
 
(0.040) (0.028) (0.023) (0.024) (0.044) (0.026) 
 % fixed-term contracts -0.558*** -0.455*** -0.341*** -0.234*** -0.149** -0.382*** 
 
(0.094) (0.049) (0.038) (0.040) (0.070) (0.043) 
Ln(firm seniority) (0.008) 0.019* 0.021** 0.026*** 0.026** 0.025*** 
 
(0.012) (0.010) (0.009) (0.008) (0.011) (0.009) 
Ln(physical capital per employee) 0.092*** 0.103*** 0.101*** 0.117*** 0.136*** 0.119*** 
 
(0.007) (0.005) (0.003) (0.004) (0.007) (0.004) 
Process innovation 0.053*** 0.027* 0.020* 0.01 -0.026 0.032*** 
 
(0.019) (0.014) (0.011) (0.014) (0.026) (0.012) 
Product innovation (0.028) 0.01 -0.005 -0.007 -0.019 -0.003 
 
(0.021) (0.016) (0.010) (0.014) (0.021) (0.012) 
Export 0.094*** 0.083*** 0.064*** 0.075*** 0.075*** 0.087*** 
 
(0.022) (0.014) (0.012) (0.014) (0.022) (0.012) 
Ln(size) 0.052*** 0.038*** 0.021*** -0.001 -0.036*** 0.013*  
 
(0.010) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.012) (0.007) 
Year 2010 -0.109*** -0.078*** -0.049*** -0.057*** -0.048** -0.074*** 
 
(0.015) (0.011) (0.011) (0.012) (0.020) (0.009) 
Constant 9.027*** 9.201*** 9.468*** 9.567*** 9.689*** 9.284*** 
 
(0.085) (0.059) (0.046) (0.050) (0.088) (0.043) 
NUTS1_level Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Sector Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R_2/PseudoR_2 0.192 0.181 0.172 0.174 0.175 0.175 
Observations 8745 
Notes: Clustered-Robust (OLS) and bootstrap standard errors with 400 replications (Quantile Regression) in parentheses.*** 
significant at .01 level; ** significant at .05 level; *significant at .10 level 
  
  
  
 
Table  6. OLS and Quantile Regressions: FLB and Labour productivity in Non-Family Firms 
 
Simultaneous Quantile estimates 
OLS 
 
Q10 Q25 Q50 Q75 Q90 
       
FLB 0.003 0.019 0.029 0.059** 0.059 0.029 
 
(0.039) (0.022) (0.029) (0.030) (0.048) (0.030) 
% executives 1.141*** 1.640*** 1.967*** 2.275*** 2.355*** 1.930*** 
 
(0.260) (0.135) (0.144) (0.188) (0.359) (0.154) 
%white collars 0.366*** 0.398*** 0.450*** 0.602*** 0.854*** 0.590*** 
 
(0.062) (0.046) (0.041) (0.062) (0.099) (0.058) 
% women -0.601*** -0.587*** -0.498*** -0.452*** -0.431*** -0.509*** 
 
(0.093) (0.042) (0.058) (0.065) (0.118) (0.063) 
 % fixed-term contracts -0.649*** -0.435*** -0.348*** -0.133 0.124 -0.334*** 
 
(0.197) (0.102) (0.102) (0.134) (0.210) (0.113) 
Ln(firm seniority) -0.016 -0.006 -0.027* -0.014 -0.047* -0.030*  
 
(0.025) (0.012) (0.016) (0.016) (0.028) (0.016) 
Ln(physical capital per employee) 0.049*** 0.076*** 0.100*** 0.120*** 0.126*** 0.107*** 
 
(0.011) (0.006) (0.008) (0.009) (0.014) (0.009) 
Process innovation 0.042 0.009 0.01 -0.015 0.082 -0.017 
 
(0.043) (0.023) (0.021) (0.026) (0.058) (0.029) 
Product innovation -0.012 0.001 -0.001 -0.017 -0.163*** -0.001 
 
(0.045) (0.021) (0.025) (0.028) (0.053) (0.028) 
Export 0.001 0.004* 0.027* 0.047* 0.029 0.018* 
 
(0.054) (0.023) (0.029) (0.032) (0.046) (0.010) 
Ln(size) 0.049** 0.026* -0.013 -0.052*** -0.101*** -0.020 
 
(0.019) (0.014) (0.011) (0.014) (0.023) (0.013) 
Year 2010 -0.037 -0.006 -0.027 -0.032 -0.048 -0.022 
 
(0.042) (0.023) (0.027) (0.027) (0.047) (0.023) 
Constant 9.823*** 9.847*** 9.950*** 10.137*** 10.646*** 9.980*** 
 
(0.215) (0.109) (0.167) (0.159) (0.242) (0.122) 
NUTS1_level Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Sector Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R_2/PseudoR_2 0.117 0.160 0.184 0.206 0.232 0.256 
Observations 2450 
Notes: Clustered-Robust (OLS) and bootstrap standard errors with 400 replications (Quantile Regression) in parentheses.*** 
significant at .01 level; ** significant at .05 level; *significant at .10 level 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
Table  7. IV Quantile Regressions: FLB and Labour productivity (whole sample) 
 
          
  IVQR_AAI     IV_2LAD     
 Q10 Q25 Q50 Q75 Q90     Q50     
                
FLB 0.685*** 0.475*** 0.437*** 0.466*** 0.646***     0.964***     
 (0.129) (0.099) (0.079) (0.066) (0.109)     (0.109)     
% executives 1.174** 0.932** 1.181* 1.554** 2.152**     0.559***     
 (0.513) (0.367) (0.653) (0.678) (1.009)     (0.177)     
%white collars 0.407*** 0.476 0.588*** 0.655*** 0.712**     0.504***     
 (0.149) (0.291) (0.161) (0.164) (0.284)     (0.029)     
% women -0.579* -0.583** -0.587*** -0.525** -0.625**     0.377***     
 (0.326) (0.294) (0.226) (0.231) (0.285)     (0.099)     
% fixed-term contracts -0.061 -0.060 -0.050 -0.016 0.225     -0.567***     
 (0.403) (0.427) (0.282) (0.386) (0.479)     (0.111)     
Ln(firm seniority) 0.014 -0.032 -0.007 -0.003 -0.050     -0.310***     
 (0.066) (0.109) (0.056) (0.068) (0.080)     (0.035)     
Ln(physical capital per employee) 0.039 0.063 0.069* 0.091** 0.089     0.106***     
 (0.040) (0.056) (0.040) (0.041) (0.059)     (0.005)     
Ln(size) 0.067 0.064 0.055 0.074 0.074     0.554***     
 (0.068) (0.053) (0.052) (0.047) (0.078)     (0.064)     
Process innovation 0.226* 0.117 0.046 0.020 0.022     0.075***     
 (0.119) (0.124) (0.088) (0.089) (0.158)     (0.021)     
Product innovation 0.170 0.103 0.106 0.055 0.034     0.012     
 (0.148) (0.121) (0.099) (0.095) (0.146)     (0.015)     
Export 0.033 0.055 0.016* 0.064* 0.065     0.040**     
 (0.164) (0.129) (0.009) (0.035) (0.114)     (0.017)     
Year 2010 -0.125 -0.211 -0.138 -0.090 -0.121     0.018     
  (0.128) (0.117) (0.069) (0.118) (0.188)     (0.016)     
Constant 8.743*** 9.163*** 9.364*** 9.240*** 9.519***     13.552***     
 (0.695) (0.764) (0.473) (0.491) (0.735)     (0.446)     
NUTS1_level Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes     Yes     
Sector Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes     Yes     
                
Observations 4708   
Notes: robust standard errors (IVQR_AAI) and bootstrap standard errors with 400 replications (IV_2LAD) in parentheses. .*** 
significant at .01 level; ** significant at .05 level; *significant at .10 level 
  
  
  
 
 
Table  8. IV Quantile Regressions: FLB and Labour productivity (Family Firms)           
 IVQR_AAI     IV_2LAD     
 Q10 Q25 Q50 Q75 Q90     Q50     
                
FLB 0.609*** 0.456*** 0.433*** 0.468*** 0.577***     0.683***     
 (0.154) (0.103) (0.105) (0.099) (0.155)     (0.086)     
% executives 1.424*** 0.796** 1.119** 1.082 1.202     0.367*      
 (0.403) (0.327) (0.483) (0.735) (0.957)     (0.217)     
%white collars 0.356 0.454* 0.432*** 0.434* 0.500     0.471***     
 (0.426) (0.263) (0.148) (0.251) (0.327)     (0.035)     
% women 0.260 0.292 0.194 0.283 0.335     0.081     
 (0.586) (0.435) (0.283) (0.414) (0.435)     (0.067)     
% fixed-term contracts -0.510* -0.551** -0.456* -0.489* -0.612     -0.494***     
 (0.279) (0.241) (0.237) (0.275) (0.420)     (0.111)     
Ln(firm seniority) 0.046 0.002 0.037 0.049 0.082     -0.301***     
 (0.236) (0.114) (0.084) (0.084) (0.143)     (0.045)     
Ln(physical capital per employee) 0.068 0.078 0.074* 0.089** 0.090*     0.111***     
 (0.056) (0.068) (0.042) (0.041) (0.053)     (0.006)     
Ln(size) 0.076 0.059 0.026 0.053 0.036     0.346***     
 (0.078) (0.074) (0.041) (0.074) (0.099)     (0.044)     
Process innovation 0.156 0.016 -0.008 0.030 0.030     0.058**     
 (0.121) (0.127) (0.103) (0.113) (0.177)     (0.025)     
Product innovation 0.200 0.104 0.072 0.023 0.048     0.010     
 (0.247) (0.108) (0.099) (0.109) (0.191)     (0.016)     
Export 0.112 0.041 0.029* 0.060 0.099*     0.061***     
 (0.140) (0.109) (0.017) (0.160) (0.053)     (0.021)     
Year 2010 -0.271* -0.181 -0.121 -0.120* -0.096     -0.019     
  (0.141) (0.109) (0.080) (0.072) (0.217)     (0.018)     
Constant 8.366*** 8.857*** 9.261*** 9.093*** 9.115***     12.563***     
 (0.931) (1.146) (0.457) (0.544) (0.880)     (0.377)     
NUTS1_level Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes     Yes     
Sector Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes     Yes     
                
Observations 2761   
  
Notes: robust standard errors (IVQR_AAI) and bootstrap standard errors with 400 replications (IV_2LAD) in parentheses. .*** 
significant at .01 level; ** significant at .05 level; *significant at .10 level 
  
  
  
  
  
  
 
Table 9. IV Quantile Regressions: FLB and Labour productivity (Family Firms with Family Management) 
  
 
IVQR_AAI IV_2LAD   
 
Q10 Q25 Q50 Q75 Q90 Q50   
  
 
   
    
FLB 0.551*** 0.420*** 0.407*** 0.468*** 0.582*** 0.573***   
 
(0.120) (0.119) (0.101) (0.105) (0.124) (0.070)   
% executives 1.403*** 0.836 1.314*** 1.028 1.279 0.529**   
 
(0.285) (1.151) (0.476) (0.649) (1.073) (0.217)   
%white collars 0.289 0.426* 0.420*** 0.362 0.445 0.514***   
 
(0.349) (0.240) (0.136) (0.226) (0.385) (0.031)   
% women -0.002 0.261 0.211 0.280 0.430 -0.062   
 
(0.546) (0.421) (0.324) (0.435) (0.557) (0.054)   
 % fixed-term contracts -0.617* -0.608*** -0.580** -0.530* -0.694** 0.332***   
 
(0.318) (0.231) (0.256) (0.288) (0.344) (0.068)   
Ln(firm seniority) 0.043 -0.012 0.026 0.034 0.035 -0.259***   
 
(0.172) (0.109) (0.086) (0.090) (0.134) (0.044)   
Ln(physical capital per employee) 0.073* 0.071* 0.068** 0.090* 0.086 0.101***   
 
(0.064) (0.057) (0.043) (0.052) (0.059) (0.007)   
Ln(size) 0.096 0.068 0.033 0.060 0.028 0.271***   
 
(0.074) (0.069) (0.044) (0.069) (0.102) (0.036)   
Process innovation 0.214 0.043 -0.018 0.025 0.011 0.054**   
 
(0.205) (0.122) (0.096) (0.108) (0.215) (0.022)   
Product innovation 0.151 0.096 0.082 0.029 0.053 0.014   
 
(0.234) (0.115) (0.095) (0.098) (0.217) (0.017)   
Export 0.087 0.040 0.035* 0.049 0.111 0.044**   
 
(0.150) (0.119) (0.018) (0.161) (0.259) (0.020)   
Year 2010 -0.113 -0.047 -0.031 -0.040 -0.075 -0.025   
  (0.113) (0.114) (0.073) (0.077) (0.125) (0.017)   
Constant 8.241*** 8.971*** 9.312*** 9.145*** 9.373*** 12.167***   
 
(1.201) (0.864) (0.494) (0.583) (0.975) (0.339)   
NUTS1_level Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes   
Sector Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes   
 
         
Observations 2557   
Notes: robust standard errors (IVQR_AAI) and bootstrap standard errors with 400 replications (IV_2LAD) 
in parentheses. .*** significant at .01 level; ** significant at .05 level; *significant at .10 level 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
Table 10. IV Quantile Regressions: FLB and Labour productivity in Non-Family Family Firms 
 IVQR_AAI IV_2LAD 
 
Q10 Q25 Q50 Q75 Q90 Q50 
FLB 0.311** 0.210 0.217 0.248** 0.196 0.647*** 
 
(0.137) (0.133) (0.143) (0.104) (0.131) (0.174) 
% executives 1.999 2.060*** 2.391*** 1.987*** 2.194* 1.306*** 
 
(1.442) (0.654) (0.487) (0.346) (1.217) (0.325) 
%white collars 0.793 0.758* 0.905*** 0.965*** 0.859*** 0.634*** 
 
(0.527) (0.388) (0.348) (0.265) (0.306) (0.090) 
% women -0.451 -0.468 -0.587** -0.762** -0.559 -0.133 
 
(0.370) (0.396) (0.285) (0.299) (0.362) (0.166) 
 % fixed-term contracts 0.129 -0.074 0.223 0.012 0.038 -0.372*  
 
(0.566) (0.446) (0.461) (0.366) (0.561) (0.191) 
Ln(firm seniority) -0.031 -0.037 -0.045 -0.127 -0.268** -0.357*** 
 
(0.113) (0.117) (0.110) (0.095) (0.125) (0.082) 
Ln(physical capital per employee) 0.036 0.033 0.065 0.072* 0.104 0.106*** 
 
(0.037) (0.057) (0.064) (0.040) (0.073) (0.014) 
Ln(size) 0.076 0.071 0.079 0.058 0.007 0.351*** 
 
(0.102) (0.092) (0.090) (0.080) (0.207) (0.086) 
Process innovation 0.138 0.034 0.068 0.015 0.077 -0.097 
 
(0.278) (0.086) (0.184) (0.113) (0.174) (0.064) 
Product innovation 0.043 -0.018 -0.172 -0.187 -0.134 0.025 
 
(0.188) (0.136) (0.180) (0.132) (0.212) (0.059) 
Export 0.116 0.061 0.077 0.021 0.049 0.047 
 
(0.156) (0.132) (0.132) (0.103) (0.186) (0.042) 
Year 2010 -0.032 -0.043 -0.005 -0.056 -0.043 -0.022 
 
(0.138) (0.096) (0.117) (0.107) (0.183) (0.037) 
Constant 9.234*** 9.871*** 9.904*** 10.601*** 11.122*** 13.031*** 
 
(0.478) (0.877) (0.858) (0.654) (0.867) (0.773) 
NUTS1_level Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Sector Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
       
Observations 782 
Notes: robust standard errors (IVQR_AAI) and bootstrap standard errors with 400 replications (IV_2LAD) in 
parentheses. .*** significant at .01 level; ** significant at .05 level; *significant at .10 level 
  
  
  
  
  
 
 
 
Appendix 
Table A.1 
Variable Definition 
FLB 
Dummy variable that equals 1 if the firm adopts a firm 
level bargaining (FLB), 0 otherwise. 
FF 
A dummy variable that equals 1 if the firm is owned and or 
controlled by a family  (FF) and 0 otherwise (NFF) 
FM 
A dummy variable that equals 1 if the family firm is 
managed by family management  (FM) and 0 otherwise 
(NFM) 
Ln (value added per capita) 
Log of value-added per employee (source AIDA) deflated 
by the value added deflator (source ISTAT) 
Ln (physical capital per capita) 
Log of capital stock per employee (source AIDA) deflated 
by the investment deflator (source ISTAT) 
n(Sales volatility)_1998-2000 
Logarithm of the standard deviation of sales over the 
period 1998-2000 
% executives Percentage of managers and supervisors 
% white collars Percentage of white collar workers 
% blue collars Percentage of manual workers 
% women Percentage of women among total workers 
% fixed-term contracts Percentage of fixed-term workers 
Ln(firm seniority) Logarithm of the age of firms 
Process Innovation 
Dummy variable that equals 1 if the firm adopted process 
innovations in the last three years, 0 otherwise 
Product Innovation 
Dummy variable that equals 1 if the firm originated new 
products in the last three years, 0 otherwise 
Export 
Dummy variable that equals 1 if the firm exported in the 
last three years, 0 otherwise 
Firm Size  Logarithm of the number of employees at firm level 
North- West 
Dummy variable that equals 1 if the firm is localised in 
North-Western regions, 0 otherwise 
North-East 
Dummy variable that equals 1 if the firm is localised in 
North-Eastern regions, 0 otherwise 
Centre 
Dummy variable that equals 1 if the firm is localised in 
Central regions, 0 otherwise 
South 
Dummy variable that equals 1 if the firm is localised in 
Southern regions, 0 otherwise 
Sectors 
Dummy variable that equals 1 if the firm is localised in 
sector shown in table1, 0 otherwise 
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
Table A.2: Family Firms (FF) and Non Family Firms (NFF), tests for differences between means and proportions 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: The test for the differences between means is the t statistic. The test to compare proportions is the  z statistic,  
*** significant at .01 percent level; **significant at .05 percent level 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Means 
Differences 
(FF –NFF)  
t / z 
statistics 
P>|t| 
 FF NFF    
FLB 0.11 0.29 -0.18*** -17.62 0.000 
Ln (value added per employee) 10.74 11.02 -0.28*** -17.98 0.000 
Ln(physical capital per employee) 9.99 10.05 -0.06 -1.12 0.263 
Ln(sales st.dev., 1998-2000) 13.06 13.55 -0.48*** -8.75 0.000 
Workforce characteristics      
% executives 0.03 0.06 -0.03*** -11.44 0.000 
% white collars 0.35 0.46 -0.11*** -12.06 0.000 
% blue collars 0.61 0.48 0.13*** 14.55 0.000 
% women 0.33 0.36 -0.03*** -3.40 0.001 
% fixed-term contracts 0.09 0.08 0.01*** 2.85 0.004 
Firm characteristics       
Firm age 24.98 25.70 -0.72 -1.28 0.199 
Process innovation  0.43 0.42 0.01 -0.13 0.899 
Product innovation 0.51 0.52 -0.01 -0.74 0.458 
Export 0.28 0.30 -0.02 -0.45 0.656 
Size: 5 <  n of employees<15 0.48 0.28 0.20*** 13.70 0.000 
Size: 15 ≦n employees < 50 0.36 0.37 -0.01 -0.80 0.422 
Size: 50 ≦ n employees < 250 0.15 0.30 -0.15*** -12.66 0.000 
Size: n of employees ≧250 0.01 0.06 -0.05*** -10.79 0.000 
Regions (NUTS1)      
North West 0.33 0.37 0.04*** -3.28 0.001 
North East 0.27 0.30 0.03** -2.53 0.011 
Centre 0.21 0.19 0.02 1.42 0.155 
South 0.19 0.13 0.06*** 5.50 0.000 
Sectors      
Textiles, wearing apparel, food industry 0.15 0.11 0.04*** 3.60 0.000 
Other manufacturing, mining, utilities 0.36 0.34 0.02 0.51 0.613 
Constructions 0.13 0.05 0.08*** 8.40 0.000 
Trade, hotels, restaurants 0.14 0.14 -0.004 -0.50 0.619 
Transport and communications 0.04 0.07 -0.03*** -5.17 0.000 
Intermediation and other business services 0.09 0.14 -0.05*** -5.92 0.000 
Education, health and private social services 0.09 0.13 -0.04*** -3.65 0.000 
     
 
  
Table A.3. IV Quantile Regressions 2_LAD: First Stage (Probit Model) 
Dependent Variable: FLB Total Sample Family Firms 
Family Firms with 
Family management 
No Family Firms 
High Sales Volatility (1/0) 0.152*** 0.212** 0.253*** 0.082 
 (0.054) (0.083) (0.085) (0.127) 
% executives 1.131*** 1.268** 1.207** 0.424 
 (0.301) (0.570) (0.502) (0.610) 
%white collars -0.073 -0.087 -0.16 -0.451 
 (0.109) (0.130) (0.200) (0.282) 
% women -0.866*** -0.701*** -0.585*** -0.902*** 
 (0.134) (0.157) (0.171) (0.318) 
% fixed term contracts -0.775*** -0.777** -0.655* -1.174** 
 (0.244) (0.378) (0.338) (0.551) 
Ln(firm seniority) 0.326*** 0.467*** 0.483*** 0.189*  
 (0.054) (0.080) (0.092) (0.110) 
Ln(physical capital per employee) -0.005 -0.017 -0.007 -0.016 
 (0.021) (0.024) (0.028) (0.041) 
Ln(size) 0.111** 0.147 0.171** 0.059 
 (0.051) (0.093) (0.086) (0.155) 
Process innovation -0.011 -0.042 -0.048 0.096 
 (0.054) (0.080) (0.083) (0.141) 
Product innovation 0.046 0.108* 0.085 -0.116 
 (0.062) (0.065) (0.074) (0.085) 
Export 0.538*** 0.464*** 0.428*** 0.595*** 
 (0.033) (0.040) (0.048) (0.059) 
Year 2010 -0.07 -0.079 -0.068 -0.099 
 (0.046) (0.070) (0.068) (0.087) 
Constant -3.973*** -4.255*** -4.372*** -2.834*** 
 (0.335) (0.368) (0.415) (0.588) 
NUTS1_level Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Sector Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
      
Observations 4708 2761 2557 782 
Notes: bootstrap standard errors with 400 replications in parentheses.*** significant at .01 level; ** significant at .05 level; 
*significant at .10 level. 
  
  
  
 
                                                           
 
